Book Review, Walking a Gantlet: Nielsen’s License to Harass by Henderson, Lynne
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2005
Book Review, Walking a Gantlet: Nielsen’s License
to Harass
Lynne Henderson
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, First Amendment Commons, Sexuality
and the Law Commons, and the Women Commons
This Article is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the
William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henderson, Lynne, "Book Review, Walking a Gantlet: Nielsen’s License to Harass" (2005). Scholarly Works. Paper 872.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/872
Book Review
Walking a Gantlet: Nielsen's
License to Harass
LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC
SPEECH by Laura Beth Nielsen. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2004. 224 pp. $35.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Lynne Hendersont
An African American person walks along a street almost anywhere. A
white stranger snarls "nigger," as s/he passes. A woman walks down the street
and hears, "Come sit on my face bitch. Hey bitch, I said come sit on my face!
HEY BITCH, I MEAN YOU....". A young African American man walking
with three friends encounters "this guy" who says, "Oh, one more of you and
you're a gang.",2 A white woman walks with her husband and hears a "guy" say
Copyright © 2005, The Regents of the University of California.
t. Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. J.D., Stanford
Law School, 1979. I am honored and thankful that the Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law &
Justice a continuation of Berkeley Women's Law Journal, has invited me to contribute to
their twentieth anniversary issue. My warmest congratulations to all who worked so hard for
many years to support and make the Journal such a success, and my best wishes for the
future of the Journal. Many, many thanks to the patient and supportive colleagues who read
earlier drafts and gave me excellent editorial and substantive suggestions: Professors Sylvia
Lazos, Steve Johnson, Ann McGinely, and Stephanie Wildman. I also thank my research
assistant, Peter Nuttall, for his conscientious last-minute help. In the interests of full
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of two articles that were published in advance of the book, and I have referred to the articles
in my Violence Against Women Seminar. I knew of her successful career at the American
Bar Foundation and have seen her at Law & Society meetings a few times since the class, but
we have not been in close contact over the years.
I. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 106 (1987).
2. LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC
SPEECH 141 (2004). Subsequent references to page numbers will be made parenthetically in
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to her, "you're nothing but a flat-assed white bitch" (p. 53). Another white
woman walks with her female partner and fearfully passes a man screaming
"fucking lesbians" or "fucking dyke" (p. 47). An African American man riding
public transportation reports, "last week, this white guy sits next to me on BART
and just starts humming, 'Swing Low, Sweet Chariot' .. ." (p. 51). People,
particularly white women and people of color, must walk a daily gantlet where
hurled insults and free speech collide, much of the time they venture from
"private," protected spaces into public places, without legal protection or
recourse.
Unlike crosses burning on lawns, swastikas spray-painted on buildings or
other surfaces, defaced posters, pornography in the workplace, and some of the
racist and sexist speech directed at individuals in the workplace, much of what is
said on the streets or other public places in this country is unheard by, and
invisible to, everyone except the individual to whom it is addressed. It is
whispered, it is hissed, it is over before it starts, and the perpetrator melts away.
With a hit-and-run attack, spoken insults are a way of "doing power"3 in public
places, of reminding people of their place in the social hierarchy, of frightening
them and subordinating them. These "drive-by shoutings, ' 4 become almost
ephemeral, easy to dismiss, deny, or trivialize. In contrast, Laura Beth Nielsen's
License to Harass takes "offensive" public speech and street harassment
seriously, making it the focus of her study.
License to Harass is an outstanding book containing empirical and
theoretical information about the problem of street harassment. For over twenty
years, critical race theory scholars and feminist scholars have decried the
sometimes daily insults women and people of color experience in their lives and
the role of "hate speech" in perpetuating stereotypes and structures of dominance
and subordination in our country. Although some very thoughtful articles and
books have argued that "hate speech" should be legally regulated,5 attempts to
the body of the text.
3. This particular phrasing comes from Professor Martha Mahoney's article on battering.
Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battering: Redefining the Issue of Separation Assault, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (1991).
4. The author is grateful to Professor Katherine Porter for this wonderful formulation of street
harassment.
5. See generally MARI J. MATSUDA, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLE W. CRENSHAW, WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?
HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); Cynthia Grant
Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV.
517 (1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1992); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Essay I: Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of a "Just
Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994); Richard Delgado & David H.
Yun, Essay II: Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic
Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, in 82 CAL. L. REV. 851, 871 (1994); Charles R.
Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J.
431 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1987).
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regulate such speech, at least outside of the workplace, have run into the brick
wall of First Amendment arguments and doctrines. 6  Further, legal scholars
criticized critical race and feminist theorists for using anecdote and narrative
descriptions rather than empirical studies to support their claims about the
frequency and damaging effects of hate speech, including street harassment.
7
Because many of these insults are "invisible" to those who are unaffected (and
this is particularly true with street harassment), it is somewhat understandable
why such speech would not be an apparent problem to many, particularly white
male legal scholars who are less likely to experience street harassment. Broadly,
anonymous insults based on race and gender whispered or shouted from
strangers addressed to a person on the street or in a public place constitutes
"street harassment." While License to Harass uses the term "offensive public
speech," which properly encompasses other public spaces in which offensive
speech occurs, scholars have also used the general term street harassment to
designate offensive public speech as well. This review will use both phrases
interchangeably when referring to racially or sexually offensive public speech.
Dr. Nielsen's book addresses both First Amendment and empirical
criticisms in reporting the results of her extensive empirical investigation of
offensive public speech. Her ambitious study documents the frequency and
effects of street harassment. License to Harass examines the role of law in
tacitly approving such encounters and surveys opinions of those affected by
offensive public speech about the potential for legal action against it. Dr.
Nielsen demonstrates that racist and sexist speech is protected by the law, while
begging or panhandling speech is routinely regulated (p. 176). Anyone wishing
to understand the multiple dimensions of the problem of street harassment and
abusive or offensive public speech should read Dr. Nielsen's book. It is a major
contribution to the literature concerning speech and its effects on people in the
United States.
This review will first describe the book, with a focus on summarizing the
empirical findings and the author's insights about those findings. In Part II, the
review covers Dr. Nielsen's discussion of the First Amendment and other
6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that ordinance prohibiting
symbolic and nonspoken verbal communications the perpetrator knows or has reason to
know would arouse anger, alarm or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender was an impermissible content-based restriction on speech); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (1999) (recognizing concerns with
racist speech, but arguing that regulation drives racist attitudes underground, making it
harder to critique them). Also see W. Bradley Wendel, The Banality of Evil and The First
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1404 (2004) (reviewing ALEXANDER TSESI, DESTRUCTIVE
MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(2002)), for a recent example of the persistence of the belief that the First Amendment must
protect racist hate speech despite its ill effects, at least from criminal sanction.
7. For example, Professors Suzanna Sherry and Daniel Farber criticize critical race theory and
feminist work for lacking veracity and empirical validation. Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807,
836-40 (1993).
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barriers to regulating street harassment and offensive public speech at this time.
In Part II, I also include my own doubts about First Amendment decisions. I
examine some social trends which I believe impair efforts to regulate offensive
speech as well. The review concludes by arguing that Dr. Nielsen's research
indicates that there is much more to learn and to be done to address a practice
that harms people on a daily basis.
I. DR. NIELSEN'S EMPIRICAL STUDY OF STREET HARASSMENT
License to Harass is a multi-disciplinary book. It provides both qualitative
and quantitative sociological data about street harassment gathered in three San
Francisco Bay Area locations. The book weaves this data together with
literature on social status, social hierarchies, social interaction theories, legal
consciousness, and First Amendment doctrines and theories. The book provides
statistical summaries of her findings, along with excerpts from extended
interviews with the people who participated in the study. Her findings indicate
that, of her sample, people of color and white women endure street harassment
on a very frequent basis. Some of the harassment is intimidating and
frightening; some of it is demeaning and dehumanizing. Almost half of the
people of color in her study (Table 3.1, p. 41) and approximately two-thirds of
the African Americans reported hearing racially harassing speech every day or
often (p. 49); approximately three out of five women reported hearing sexually
suggestive, offensive remarks every day or often (Table 3.2, p. 43). Women of
color reported offensive speech occurrences most often (p. 44). Yet the vast
majority of the subjects did not believe that there ought to be a legal remedy for
the harassment. The reasons given reveal how much sway First Amendment
rationales have in our culture. Additionally, cultural beliefs lead some subjects
to question the efficacy and desirability of using law to combat social problems
and even disfavor regulation (p. 2).
The book contains seven chapters and two appendices, as well as eleven
tables summarizing Dr. Nielsen's data. The ambition of the book becomes
apparent in Chapter One, where the author introduces the problem of offensive
public speech, discusses research questions on law and legal consciousness
among citizens, charts the role of the First Amendment and free speech in
influencing attempts to address offensive speech, and outlines her empirical
study. Chapter Two outlines the legal doctrines and commentary on regulating
speech in public places in a clear and succinct fashion and introduces
sociological theories and studies about law, power, people's beliefs, and social
interaction. Chapter Two also discusses the relatively few previous empirical
studies of street harassment, introducing legal readers to an empirical literature
they may not have encountered before.
Chapters Three through Six report the findings of Dr. Nielsen's research,
beginning with reports of personal experiences with offensive speech, then
moving to people's views of the nature and severity of the problem of offensive
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public speech and law, and concluding with legal and individual responses and
resistance to offensive speech. In each chapter, Dr. Nielsen relates her findings
to claims of other theorists and studies, gives examples from interviews, and
presents quantitative information. In Chapter Seven, she discusses explanations
for why and how legal solutions to street harassment have failed.
There is a great deal going on in this book; it is quite readable and well-
written overall, and it covers a wide range of material and ideas in relatively few
pages. In a sense, it is really two books addressing the nature of hate speech: it
is a book with original research on street harassment and the effect of street
harassment on those who are targets, and it is also a book about the sociology of
law, understandings of law, and the influence of law on behaviors and cultural
norms with original research that applies and questions some of the most quoted
sociological literature on the subject. My focus in this review is on the aspects
of the book that are perhaps of most concern to lawyers and legal scholars, as
well as the focus of the Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law, & Justice and its
readership.
Because Dr. Nielsen is drawing on so many areas of knowledge, working
at the intersection of those areas, and doing so with an economy of space, she
sometimes juggles too much to explain or develop a theme adequately for a
reader who may be unfamiliar with one set of fields, such as sociology of law.
With so much going on, Dr. Nielsen does provide helpful summaries, but the
summaries can be repetitive rather than helping to move the analysis forward. 8
Despite this, the book is a valuable resource, containing important insights and
information for scholars working in numerous disciplines, including law.
A. The Methodology of the Study
The book is based on Dr. Nielsen's dissertation research, which was
undertaken in response to the relative paucity of research on the frequency and
effects of street harassment and as an attempt to address gaps in the existing
research (p. 5). She studied three types of offensive public speech: "begging" or
"panhandling," "sexually suggestive speech," and "race-related speech" (p. 3).
She chose begging as a kind of control within her analysis because it is a type of
speech that targets almost anyone on the streets or in public places.
Additionally, begging is a form of "unsolicited street speech that frequently
targets white men" (p. 4), who are less likely to be targets of sexually suggestive
and race-based speech. Begging is a good choice as a control for legal reasons
as well: begging is a form of speech or communication that has not enjoyed
consistent First Amendment protection, has not been the subject of high-profile
cases or legal arguments, and has frequently been regulated by law (p. 20). Dr.
Nielsen identifies "sexually suggestive speech" as offensive speech, although her
8. There are a few text editing glitches as well. For example, a portion of the text beginning
with the statement: "Nevertheless, the laws exist and are enforced because the regulated
behaviors..." on pages 120-21 is repeated almost verbatim on page 122.
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subjects made a distinction between permissible and impermissible sex-based
speech (p. 4). "Race-based speech" encompasses any speech referring directly
or indirectly to the race of the recipient that subjects found inappropriate and
offensive.
The Introduction briefly describes the study method (pp. 12-14); two
appendices explain her method in detail (pp. 181-205). The study was carefully
designed, following standard social science research methods for sociologists.
Dr. Nielsen identified three separate areas in Northern California in which to
conduct her study: San Francisco, Berkeley/Oakland, and Orinda (a well-to-do
San Francisco suburb) (p. 13). 9 The purpose was to obtain a cross-section of
environments in which to observe public interactions and from which to recruit
subjects for interviews. She chose various locations in these cities to observe
street interactions and establish a base of understanding to assist in formulating
her interview questions (Appendix A, pp. 182-83). She observed people on the
streets in these areas for about 120 hours, taking notes and attempting to "keep a
low profile as a passive observer" (Appendix A, p. 182). At some points,
however, she herself became the target of offensive speech (Id.).
In the second stage of the research, she recruited subjects at chosen
locations to interview in depth about their experiences and attitudes (Id.). The
locations she chose were Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART") stations and streets,
although she reports she had less success recruiting subjects for the study whom
she approached on the streets (Appendix A, p. 187). To overcome bias in her
selection of people to approach, she used a number of techniques to select
subjects (Id.). Although the sample is not statistically random, she did attempt to
overcome her own preferences and comfort level about approaching people by
using this method (ld.). After identifying herself as a University of California
researcher interested in street interactions, she asked subjects if they would be
willing to be interviewed by telephone (Id.). Of the 212 people she approached,
112 agreed to participate (p. 188). She ultimately obtained interviews with 100
of them (Id.). She was unable to reach the other 12, either because the phone
numbers given to her were inaccurate or the potential participants failed to return
her messages (Id.).
While the resulting sample is not proportionately representative of those
who frequent BART in the locations she chose, it is diverse. Far more women
than men agreed to participate; 51% of the participants in the study were white,
and 49% were people of color, including African American, Latino/a and Asian
subjects (Table A.1, p. 189). Indeed, Dr. Nielsen indicates she "oversampled
white women and people of color for analytic purposes" (p. 188). Although she
does not explain this further, oversampling those most likely to be targets of
sexist and racist street harassment allows for studying rates and variations on
incidents, reactions, and attitudes among those more likely to experience
9. Nielsen was a graduate student at U.C. Berkeley with limited resources, so she chose
accessible locations which still varied in income and demographic levels (p. 184).
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harassment. The probability of obtaining a range of responses increases with the
larger sampie.
Using a questionnaire relying primarily on open-ended questions and
guided follow-up questions, Dr. Nielsen conducted telephone interviews with the
individuals who agreed to be interviewed as subjects in the study (Appendix B,
pp. 198-205). Her questions concerned street interactions generally as well as
offensive interactions, specifically the frequencies of offensive interactions, and
whether the person saw the interactions as a personal problem or a social
problem (Id.). The questionnaire also addressed the subject's attitudes about law
and legal regulation of offensive public speech (1d.).
Although it is a well-designed and careful study, the methodology is not
without flaws and can be criticized - as can most individual social science
studies - on various points. For example, women are overrepresented in the
sample, and Dr. Nielsen's gender and race (female, white) could have
unconsciously influenced responses from both female and male subjects.
Because the study is retrospective and based on the subjects' reported
experiences, it is vulnerable to criticism for selection bias and bias in
recollections. The sample is also "relatively young" and "well educated" (p.
190), and thus is not representative of the population as a whole. In fact, the San
Francisco Bay Area is atypical of the United States educationally, culturally and
politically. The population of Berkeley is more educated and prosperous than
neighboring Oakland, although Berkeley does have poor and minority areas (pp.
184-85). Dr. Nielsen was quite aware that the presence of the University of
California could skew her sample and attempted to prevent having too many
students represented in her sample by conducting her Berkeley interviews during
the summer, although there were still many students in Berkeley during that time
(p. 190). Her data also does not reveal much about offensive public speech
based on both gender and race in many instances. Thus, although she did find
women of color to be the most likely subjects of street harassment, there really
isn't any explanation or further investigation of the problem of intersectionality
or multiple sources of subordination, beyond a notation that "the myth of
heightened sexuality about women of color" might account for this higher rate
(p. 44). Due to some of these concerns, and because the sample size is only 100
people (although large for a study of this type), it is important to caution that
making sweeping generalizations from the study is not possible. Nevertheless,
her research provides useful and fascinating qualitative and quantitative data on
offensive speech.
B. Offensive Public Speech: Economic, Racial, and Sexual Speech
Dr. Nielsen provides a rich exposition with her results, integrating excerpts
from interviews with her subjects along with her quantitative observations to
illustrate various points and to provide qualitative information about the
subjects' experiences and attitudes. The following summary of her findings
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omits the narratives she excerpts from interviews in the interests of space, but for
anyone concerned with the issues of offensive public speech, they are well-worth
reading.
Of the speech categories she investigated, begging appeared to be the most
common form of offensive public speech encountered by her subjects, although
most respondents didn't characterize begging as offensive (p. 40). All reported
having been approached by panhandlers, and 87% of those interviewed said that
it occurred every day or often in their experience (Id.).10 Although some subjects
felt threatened by panhandlers or had experienced some aggressive panhandling,
few viewed begging as personally threatening (p. 40). Few subjects reported that
they considered begging a problem for them personally (p. 69), but a majority
saw it as a social problem (p. 77).
Dr. Nielsen divided sexual speech into "polite remarks about appearance"
and "offensive or sexually suggestive remarks" (Table 3.2, p. 43), relying on the
subject's own definitions of whether public speech interactions were offensive
since sexist or "sexual" speech might be perceived as "polite compliments or
relatively harmless pick-up lines" (p. 44). The number of offensive remarks
exceeded "polite remarks" and 62%1 of women reported hearing such offensive
or suggestive remarks every day or often (Id.). Sixty-eight percent of the women
of color reported such remarks as occurring every day or often, whereas white
women reported a rate of 55% (p. 44). Only 14% of men reported offensive
speech based on gender, and two-thirds of men never or rarely heard offensive
or sexually suggestive comments directed at women (Table 3.2, p. 43). Many
women also reported physical conduct to Dr. Nielsen, ranging from groping to
stalking (pp. 44-46). Slightly over half of the women in the study said sexually
suggestive speech was a personal problem, finding it threatening and degrading,
while only 15% of the men saw it as a "personal" problem (p. 72). But a full
75% of those interviewed identified it as a social problem rooted in gender
hierarchy (p. 78).
Forty-six percent of all the people of color (Table 3.1, p. 41) and 63% of
the African Americans in the study reported hearing offensive comments about
their race every day or often (p. 49). Less than 5% of whites reported this
frequency of comment (p. 49). Offensive speech reported by subjects ranged
from "race-related jokes and quips, to subtle hinting that [the person] should 'go
back where they came from,' to whispers, shouts, and even physical altercations"
(p. 49). In many of the interviews Dr. Nielsen excerpts, the offensive speaker
appears to be "speaking in code" rather than using explicitly racist speech. For
example, a young African American man who was a clerk at a camera store in a
"white" area reported a white male customer who was irritated about not being
able to cash a check without I.D. and told the clerk, "things sure aren't the way
10. This may be because the areas she chose were sites she knew were used by panhandlers.
11. Actually, it is not clear whether the percentage is 61 or 62. Table 3.1 indicates 61% said
every day/often (p. 41), but Table 3.2 reports 19% "everyday" and 43% "often," which adds
up to 62% (p. 43).
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they used to be," with a "real mean look" (p. 51). A large majority, some 89%,
saw "race-related" comments as a social problem (p. 80); 51% of the people of
color identified it as a personal problem, some finding it to be offensive, hurtful,
and dismissive of them as persons (pp. 73-74). Perhaps not surprisingly given a
general societal consensus that racist speech is wrong, all of the subjects
identified race-related speech as the most serious social problem of the three
types of offensive public speech (p. 82). 12
The interviewees reported different ways of attempting to avoid the
harassing speech, with the greatest efforts to avoid street harassment undertaken
by women. The main strategy for coping with panhandlers seemed to be
"ignoring" or apologizing for not having money to give (p. 161). People of color
who were targets of racist speech tended to believe that there was "little, if
anything, [they] can do to avoid racist speech from strangers in public places,"
and therefore took no steps to avoid it (p. 65). On the other hand, in what Dr.
Nielsen calls the "detailed calculus for being in public,"' 3 all the women
described a variety of strategies to avoid sexually suggestive speech, including
avoiding certain locations, altering their travel routes, considering the time of
day, avoiding eye contact, dressing to disguise their bodies, walking
"purposefully," and trying to determine the dangers inherent in the interaction
(pp. 57-65).
Consistent with the ranking of the seriousness of the problems of the three
types of speech, two-thirds of the subjects interviewed did not think that begging
ought to be regulated, primarily because of "compassion" or empathy for the
speaker's situation t4 and reluctance to punish people for begging (p. 94).
Despite widespread agreement that sexually offensive speech and race-related
speech are social problems, and despite the restrictions sexually suggestive
speech places on women's freedom of being and movement in public spaces, the
majority of people Dr. Nielsen interviewed did not favor legal regulation of
either form of offensive speech (p. 97). Those for whom begging or racial
speech was a serious personal problem were more in favor of regulation (pp. 87-
88). But the relationship between views of speech as a problem and favoring
legal regulation was reversed for sexually suggestive speech (Id.). A solid
majority of people for whom racial speech was a personal problem favored
regulations of it (p. 88), while "those who are more often the targets of sexually
suggestive speech are less likely to favor legal regulation of these comments" (p.
87). Interestingly, men "were slightly more likely to favor regulation" of such
12. Interestingly, the primary explanation for race-related speech reported by subjects was
"ignorance." Subjects identified the social problem in terms of a concern with speech
leading to violence and reinforcing existing social divisions.
13. "The detailed calculus" arises from "being on guard" or having "awareness of one's
surroundings and not taking safety for granted," thus one adjusts behavior and vigilance
when concerned about safety (pp. 55-56).
14. Dr. Nielsen calls it "compassion," but some of the quotes from interviews seem to suggest
that subjects considered being in the beggar's shoes, or even had the experience of having to
beg.
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speech than women, although a majority of both genders opposed restrictions
(Id.). Support for regulation rose, however, when Dr. Nielsen asked questions
involving more extreme examples of aggressive panhandling and racist or sex-
based public speech (p. 84).15
C. Attitudes About Legal Regulation of Offensive Speech
Dr. Nielsen explores the reasons given by subjects for not regulating
offensive speech. She found the reasons used to explain why they did not favor
legal regulation could be placed in four categories of "legal consciousness"
(understandings of law and its role in everyday life) 16 (p. 105). Not surprisingly,
the First Amendment was mentioned by many subjects as a reason speech should
not be regulated.17 The First Amendment was cited as a primary reason by 55%
of all the men, including 80% of white men (Table 5.1, p. 106). A total of 46%
of whites, but only 33% of people of color, cited the First Amendment as the
primary reason to oppose regulation (Id.). In explaining the importance of the
First Amendment, people reflected themes embodied in legal doctrine. For
instance, subjects raised concerns about the "slippery slope" of censorship, a
distinction between speech and conduct, and the concept of incitement (pp. 107-
12).
A second cited reason for opposing legal regulation, which Dr. Nielsen
designates as the "autonomy paradigm," appeared in the statements of many
women (p. 113). By "autonomy," Dr. Nielsen does not mean the autonomy of
the speaker, but rather autonomy claims made by the targets of sexist speech (p.
105). Twenty-eight percent of women (and only 3% of men) cited "autonomy"
as the reason to resist legal regulation (Table 5.1, p. 106). Actually, a number of
different rationales, not all manifesting "autonomy" as we commonly think of it,
appear to fall into this category. This group indicated that they preferred to
handle the offensive speech themselves, because they believed they could control
the situation without legal intervention, didn't want to appear weak and in need
of legal protection, or dismissed the problem as "not so bad," even after
15. E.g., "An African American is walking on a public street and a white person shouts loudly,
'I'm going to get you nigger.' Should this be legal?" (Appendix B., p. 204); "You are on a
public street and a man, apparently homeless, shouts, 'How about some money?' When you
refuse or ignore him, he follows you for about one block, making repeated requests. He does
not touch you or block your path. Should this be legal?" (Appendix B, p. 203); "A woman
is walking on a public street and a man says, 'Come suck my dick!' Should this be legal?"
(id.).
16. "Legal consciousness" is a term used by sociologists studying the intersection of law with
individual actors. The definition of "legal consciousness" varies according to the theorist
and researcher. How people think about law and its role, how they use law, and how law
shapes thinking all fall within this phrase. Dr. Nielsen notes that the study of legal
consciousness includes individual's "commonsense understanding of the way the law works"
or "how people think about the law" (p. 7).
17. At least this reviewer was not surprised, given the extensive media coverage of First
Amendment issues and likelihood of awareness of the First Amendment from media and
educational sources, especially given the high educational level of the author's subjects.
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reporting disturbing experiences (pp. 113-19). Indeed, Dr. Nielsen notes, "As
soon as the idea of law as a potential remedy is introduced, women discount the
harm they have just explained" (p. 117). A few male subjects made cracks about
women running to "big daddy court" (p. 118), demeaning women who seek
support or legal protection. Nevertheless, female subjects did express a desire to
independently assert themselves against offensive speech, rather than involve
legal authorities (p. 114).
Another explanation for women discounting the seriousness of offensive
speech may be found in women's reports of being flattered when complimented
or their enjoyment of being recognized as attractive when they are in public
places. The paradox of heterosexuality means that some women may tolerate
offensive behavior in order to gain recognition by men; some women may
suppress conflict in order to maintain a sense of relationship or attractiveness to
men. Reacting negatively to "just a compliment" may seem overly feminist,
"too sensitive," or offensive to a possible suitor. In addition, the fact that some
women don't mind sexist banter in the workplace has been used as a reason to
dismiss the complaints of those women who do mind such talk in sexual
harassment cases as hypersensitive and unreasonable.' 8 But the fact that some
women don't mind and even enjoy remarks about their appearance and sexuality
doesn't mean that they do not make distinctions, as the subjects in Dr. Nielsen's
study did, between "polite" comments which should be tolerated (or appreciated)
and offensive comments (p. 43). Nor should the differences among women be
used to dismiss the harm offensive speech has on many women.
The third explanation for opposing regulation is "impracticality" (p. 119).
This pragmatic justification appears to draw on both concerns about law
enforcement and beliefs regarding allocation of legal resources. Impracticality
was the primary reason cited for opposing regulation by 26% of the subjects
(Table 5.1, p. 106). In anonymous street encounters, the "sheer impracticality of
catching, trying, and punishing individuals who would violate such laws"
deterred interest in legal intervention (p. 119). Even if the subjects believed
legal regulation would be a good idea, some indicated offensive speech
regulations would be difficult to enforce and hard to prove (p. 120). Another
reason voiced against legal intervention was that courts and police should
concern themselves with more serious offenses or were already overburdened (p.
121). Some believed that regulation would drive racist and sexist beliefs and
speakers underground, making racist and sexist attitudes more covert and
difficult to correct (p. 123). 19
Dr. Nielsen characterizes the last justification offered against legal
regulation of street harassment as "distrust of authority/cynicism about law" (p.
18. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813,845(1991).
19. SHIFFRIN, supra note 6. The distinction between "covert" and "overt" racism and the
difficulties in combating the former were addressed by Stokely Charmichael and Charles
Hamilton in the 1960s. STOKELY CHARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER
(1967).
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124). She reports: "Many women report a 'backlash' effect when they invoke
the law to solve 'gender' problems; many African Americans, especially men,
report indifference, corruption, and blatant racism in their brushes with the law"
(p. 129). Actually, three themes run through the comments offered for this
justification. The first is distrust of the legal system based on previous contacts
with the system (p. 124). Over half of the nine African American men
interviewed indicated distrust of authority as the reason to avoid legal regulation
(Table 5.1, p. 106): "African American men tell sadly familiar tales of unjust
police action.. ." (p. 125). The second theme, cynicism or skepticism, relied on
past experiences with the law as a basis of opinion (p. 124). One woman
reported: "I have been harassed at every job I have ever had and it's illegal, but
it doesn't do any good" (Id.). The third theme was that "the law cannot and does
not change society" (p. 126). Yet in the statements excerpted in the book, there
is less cynicism than discouragement: beliefs that claims will be unheard, fear of
retaliation, beliefs that help will never come, and resentment and distrust of law
enforcement (Id.). One African American man said, "They're never going to
enforce laws like that anyway. Look at affirmative action - it's all going away
anyhow" (p. 125).
A few subjects did favor laws against offensive speech or at least gave
reasons for having such laws (pp. 101-02). Other subjects who did not
ultimately favor regulation raised similar notions (p. 102). Dr. Nielsen notes,
"The 'right to be left alone' is a theme that arose often in the interview" (Id.).
Although "there is no formal legal 'right' to be left alone," (ld.) it is certainly a
"right" which has a long history in American consciousness, 20 and it is revealing
that the subjects interviewed believed in such a right. Thus, "a 'right' to go out
in a public place and.., a 'right' not to be spoken to in an offensive tone of
voice" are more than "politeness norms" for these subjects: these comport with
concepts of fundamental rights of autonomy, dignity, and equal concem and
respect (p. 103).
These arguments for regulation also appear to reflect a lay version of the
legal arguments for prohibiting hate speech (p. 2). Some individuals noted the
symbolic effects of law (p. 103). In contrast to despair or cynicism, these people
saw the law as "a way to codify social norms and to make the statement that such
behavior is socially unacceptable," even if the law could not be enforced (Id.).
Some saw the link of offensive speech to violence, suggesting that the speech
could provoke a violent response (p. 104), in line with Chaplinsky's "fighting
21
words" doctrine (p. 23). Others cited a "right to be free from offense," (p.
104) and all those who favored "legal intervention to prevent racist and sexist
20. Justice Brandeis's famous observation about "the right to be let alone" from Olmstead has
given the phrase some purchase in case law, although there is no "fundamental right" to be
left alone. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569, 572 (1942) (discussing the "fighting
words" doctrine, words that either inflict injury or incite violence or breach the peace by
their very utterance).
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speech [had] strong feelings that they should not be subjected to it" (p. 105).
If a majority of the subjects who found racial and sexually suggestive
speech to be a personal and social problem did not think a legal response was
appropriate, how did they think the problem should be addressed? Dr. Nielsen
states that many of her subjects believed offensive racist and sexist speech "can
and should be handled by its targets" (p. 133). This solution, however,
transforms what a large majority of the subjects recognized as a "social problem"
into a problem for the individual alone. Placing the burden on the individual to
respond in turn raises the question of "resistance."
A currently popular notion in legal and social theory is that of the
"resistance" of the oppressed or subordinated to oppressive regimes, although
just what constitutes "resistance" remains elusive (pp. 138-39). With resistance
of some form in mind, Dr. Nielsen asked her subjects about their reactions to
offensive speech as well as their thoughts about possible countermeasures. Dr.
Nielsen identified two possible categories of individual responses: 1) those in
which targets of offensive speech responded with speech and active "resistance,"
and 2) those in which targets resorted to a variety of non-verbal and internal
responses or coping mechanisms. Given that remedies for offensive speech
advocated by First Amendment scholars include the argument for "more speech"
as the solution on the theory that "more speech" will undermine racist and sexist
speech in "the free marketplace of ideas" (pp. 134-35), Dr. Nielsen looked for
examples of corrective speech responses in her interviews. Although some
engaged in "counter speech," it was far more common that their "resistance" was
internal (p. 164) (and invisible to the one responsible for the offensive speech),
which does little to convey a corrective message to the offending speaker. A
possible explanation for the internalized responses is in Dr. Nielsen's
observation that "[a]ll targets, whether they reported responding to such speech
or not, said that they weighed their options very carefully when deciding how to
respond, and the most important factor that determined their response was their
own safety in the situation" (pp. 164-65). In other words, the subjects engaged
in a detailed calculus in deciding what, if anything, to do when they were
confronted by offensive speech.
The fear of violence appears to suppress responses by targets of racist
speech (pp. 140-41), although "very few respondents in this study could tell of
times when a racist comment actually resulted in a physical altercation" (p. 141).
Interestingly, at least in some examples, it appeared the subject had to suppress
his or her own urge to retaliate physically in reaction to "fighting words," rather
than the subject reporting a fear of physical retaliation by the offender (See pp.
141-44). Dr. Nielsen found that only "[s]lightly more than a quarter of people of
color.., ever had directly responded to racist comments" (p. 141). And from
the examples of spoken resistance to offensive racial speech, it is difficult to tell
whether the subjects were responding to racist comments directed at them
personally or at another individual (pp. 141, 143). For example, Dr. Nielsen
cites an interview with an African American woman who spoke of correcting
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slurs against Asians, not slurs that were directed at the woman herself or African
Americans in general (p. 141). Those that did speak in response to racial
comments mostly reported the response as an effort to educate the speaker,
consistent with many subjects quoted throughout the book who characterized
racist speech as the product of "ignorance" rather than blatant bigotry (E.g., pp.
74, 146). The most common response reported, however, was to "ignore" the
speech (p. 145). The reasons for ignoring varied from the attributions of
(hopeless?) ignorance of the speaker to fear of the speaker (pp. 146-147). Other
subjects rationalized the statements as being the speaker's problem, which
arguably is another form of internal "resistance" to the speaker's message,
although it also does little to communicate resistance or facilitate change (p.
145).
Sexually offensive speech did produce spoken responses in 42% of the
total of women interviewed, all of whom had "claimed to have been the target of
offensive, sexually suggestive speech by a stranger in a public place" (p. 148).
In some of the examples given, the nature of the speech in response to a sexist
comment is not necessarily "educative," but rather evasive, often drawing on
assertions of male protection by claiming a boyfriend or husband to deter
approaches from strange men (pp. 151-52). For example, a white woman subject
reported that she was buying flowers and "a gentleman" came up to her and said
"you know, I'd really like to take you out" (p. 152). She "chuckled kind of at
first and said, 'No thank you, I have a boyfriend"' (this didn't deter the man,
who ultimately said, "Wow, your legs go from your ass to the ground") (Id.). In
fact, "[o]nly nine women reported that they had ever responded assertively with
more speech. . ." (p. 148) in ways that might counter or educate the speaker,
illustrated by statements such as, "Does your mother know you're here - talking
to women this way?" (p. 150). Three women resorted to a well-known hand
signal in response to offensive speech (Id.) and others "glared" or "gave... a
dirty look" (p. 151). Outside of confronting the source of the speech, some
women reported the experience to others with varying results (pp. 153-55).
Other women "left," "laughed it off," decided the speaker was "stupid" or had a
"problem," and even denied that the remark was directed at them or had occurred
(p. 156). While deciding the speaker is stupid might protect the individual from
internalizing the insult, it does little to communicate that the remark is offensive.
Laughing it off appears to communicate to the speaker that the remark is
inoffensive or even appreciated. Ultimately, as with racist speech, the most
common reaction to sexually suggestive speech was to "ignore it" (p. 157).
Again, "fear of consequences" influenced the decision to ignore, as did a belief
that the man was seeking a response and a belief that ignoring was the best
possible response (pp. 157-59).
In contrast, Dr. Nielsen found that "the most common response to begging
is actually to respond to the person by speaking," although ignoring the beggar
was also very common (p. 161). Apparently, most of the subjects saw begging
as "trivial and non-threatening" (p. 162), although some had negative
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experiences with aggressive panhandlers (p. 140). Dr. Nielsen found that most
people tried to be "polite" in refusing requests for money, but a few were
aggressive in their responses: "What are you doing asking me for money? You
ought to give me what you got" (p. 161).
D. Summary
Dr. Nielsen interprets her data to mean that offensive public speech results
in harm to racially and sexually subordinated groups by reinforcing social
hierarchies, not only as a "simple reminder of lower status," but by emotionally
and psychologically burdening the targets of the speech and forcing them to take
"precautions... to avoid being made a target" (p. 6). Concerns with the
potential for or the actual fear of violence run through the reports of many of her
subjects. Difficulties in every day negotiation of public space are
disproportionately experienced by women, men of color, and those in poverty,
where "hate speech is but one mechanism of subordination" (Id.). Yet, for
multiple reasons, most of the subjects in License to Harass say that invoking the
law for regulation of any offensive speech is still undesirable (E.g., p. 97).
THE INFLUENCE OF LAW AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LEGAL CHANGE
The data and interviews demonstrate that people in the License to Harass
study objected to offensive public speech and street harassment because it
created personal problems for them and because many viewed it as a social
problem as well (p. 68). Street harassment affects its target's freedom and daily
choices (p. 56). Women must change their behavior to avoid begging and
sexually suggestive speech far more than men (p. 57). Dr. Nielsen states, "Being
in public is gendered in that women are effectively excluded from certain
locations... [and] experience being in public qualitatively differently than do
men" (Id.). Women reported engaging in a number of conscious strategies and
adjustments in their attempts to avoid unwanted sexually suggestive speech (pp.
57-65). They reported doing so even in the face of the ambivalence expressed by
both women and men about gendered public remarks, designating some as
"flattering," "flirtation," "only trying to meet women," and so forth on one side
of the spectrum and degrading, insulting, and frightening on the other (p. 44).
However, there was widespread agreement that "racial remarks" of any kind are
never appropriate (p. 139), consistent with general social norms condemning
racist speech and also perhaps with a belief in "color blindness" (that race ought
never to make a difference and ought not to be mentioned). People of color in
the study did not believe they could avoid racist speech from strangers (p. 64),
perhaps because they believed remarks were so pervasive that it would make no
difference (p. 65) (and they certainly cannot easily change their appearance),
although they did report attempting to avoid it "because it may lead to violence"
or "because it is so offensive" (p. 66). Among those who venture into public
places, women of color must face racist and sexist street harassment as well as
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begging, requiring a more complex detailed calculus to avoid offensive public
speech.
The irresistible urge of most legal scholars faced with a social and
potentially legal problem is to ask, "What is to be done?" The results of the
study do not provide a clear answer. Dr. Nielsen observes,
Scholars on all sides of the hate speech debate can be pleased with these
findings. Those who advocate restrictions on offensive speech can point
to the empirical data as proof that such interactions are experienced as
troubling and having serious effects on targets. Those who advocate
First Amendment protection for such speech will be reassured by the
finding that most average Americans disfavor the legal regulation of
offensive public speech.
(p. 172). Dr. Nielsen also argues that the data is more complicated than these
simple characterizations. Perhaps the data was influenced by the location in
which the research was conducted, as the San Francisco Bay Area, and not only
Berkeley, may be more liberal in its general views of free speech and resistant to
legal regulation for many reasons, as residents pride themselves on their
tolerance. At the same time, Dr. Nielsen's data also suggests that even in a
highly diverse area which considers itself enlightened, liberal, and tolerant of
racial and sexual differences, women and men of color endure a considerable
amount of harassment from others in public places. Thus the question of "what
can be done?" still remains open.
Dr. Nielsen observes that the data does not fit existing narratives in the hate
speech debates, and that the arguments given by her subjects are more complex
and nuanced than the debates which have engaged legal scholars (p. 167). The
position of the author is that racial and sexual harassment in public places is a
harmful part of a system of racial and gender hierarchy, and that if the
relationship of offensive speech to those structures was more clearly recognized,
there might be a change in thinking about whether law should regulate offensive
public speech in some way. At times, Dr. Nielsen suggests that eventually
consciousness of the harms of offensive public speech will coalesce to produce
legal change, as awareness that racist and sexist speech in the workplace led to
legal actions under Title VII, 22 but at other times, she seems to concede that
nothing can or will be done to regulate offensive public speech (pp. 177-79).
22. Racist and sexist speech, if sufficiently "severe and pervasive" can create a "hostile
environment" in a workplace, altering the terms and conditions of employment and creating
a cause of action under Title VII. But "mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders
offensive feelings (sic) in an employee" does not constitute a hostile environment. Harris v.
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60
(1986)). There has been a growing sentiment among some legal scholars and lawyers that
regulating racist and sexist speech in the workplace via sexual harassment and hostile
environment actions also may violate the First Amendment. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1797-98 (1992) (distinguishing
between protected and unprotected racist and sexist speech in the workplace based on
whether the speech is "directed" at an individual or not).
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Dr. Nielsen offers several explanations for the absence of an organized
effort to end or regulate offensive street speech, including a ranking of low
priority among the affected groups, the First Amendment, ambivalence about
using legal remedies to solve the problem as manifested by the subjects of her
interviews, and female "ambivalence about sexually suggestive speech" (p. 165).
She notes a failure to see the connection between racist and sexist speech and
more formally recognized manifestations of subordination: physical attacks, rape
or stalking, discriminatory and degrading treatment in the workplace, lack of
opportunities because of discrimination, and in general, trivialization of harms
experienced by subordinate groups in the larger society (p. 178). Additionally,
larger social themes and beliefs may make the prospects bleak for taking action
against offensive public speech in the near future.
Dr. Nielsen sees law as intimately involved in supporting offensive speech
and therefore, finds it complicit in maintaining systems of racial and gender
hierarchy (p. 168). Law shapes people's thinking and interpretation of
experiences and in turn people shape law (pp. 7-8). Dr. Nielsen notes that law
plays a role in reinforcing racist and sexist public speech by legitimating it (p.
176). I agree: in a culture which frequently compounds what is legal with what
is moral or ethical, law tacitly approves such speech by protecting it against the
protests of those who are subject to the insults, fears, and limits such speech
imposes on them.2 3 In the United States, there is a tendency to believe if
something is legal it must be good or appropriate, or at least not bad, even to
engage in conduct or speech no matter how hurtful. Given this attitude, legal
inaction cannot be lightly dismissed. Accordingly, barriers to legal regulation of
offensive public speech should be examined critically.
A. The "Brick Wall" of the First Amendment
First Amendment case law protects a great deal of offensive speech, and
freedom of speech is one of the most highly valued, if not the most valued of
rights in the Constitution. Yet as Professor Matsuda pointed out in an article in
1989, "First Amendment doctrine is notably confused. ' '24 Not all speech, even
public, "political" speech, enjoys absolute, consistent protection from the courts.
A recent example is the Supreme Court's willingness to restrict speech near
abortion clinics and health care facilities. In a decision upholding a Colorado
law making it an offense to "knowingly approach" a person within a restricted
space without her consent in order to communicate anti-abortion messages, the
25Court held that the restrictions were reasonable. Justice Stevens wrote that the
statute was
23. And it may be that the influence of understandings about law and society have led the
subjects in this study (who tend to be young and educated) to assume the law simply cannot
ever be used to regulate offensive racial and sexual public speech.
24. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2349.
25. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).
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[A] traditional state exercise of the States' "police powers to protect the
health and safety of their citizens."'26 That interest may justify a special
focus on unimpeded access to health care facilities and the avoidance of
potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests...
The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication
has been repeatedly identified in our cases. It is an aspect of the broader
"right to be let alone"....27
Yet in the well-known case involving attempts by the city of Skokie,
Illinois, to prevent a proposed march by the American Nazi Party through a town
with many Jewish residents including Holocaust survivors, the courts rejected
proposed regulations as violating the First Amendment. The trauma posed to
Holocaust survivors by having Nazis march through the city they lived, in a
horrid reprise of what they had experienced, as well as the threat of violence
posed by a proposed march, were insufficient reasons to enjoin the march,
regulate certain forms of communication, or to burden the speakers' right to free
28
speech. Although Skokie's efforts to prevent the march were obvious attempts
to suppress Nazi speech, to this day I believe, under the circumstances, such
efforts were justified by the tremendous pain the march would have caused so
many people. I also realize that most, if not every, leading First Amendment
scholar disagrees with my view. I realize the difficulty of regulating speech, as
well as concerns about abuse of government power to control democratic
discourse and ideas, but if the trauma to unwilling listeners and potential for
violence at abortion clinics allows for heavy regulation of public speech,3° I do
not see how the courts can justify allowing racist hate speech in Skokie, despite
the Court's previous declaration that such regulations are impermissible content-
based restrictions (p. 24). 31
Indeed, I am sympathetic to arguments that the First Amendment ought to
allow regulation of at least some hate speech, if the regulations are carefully
26. Id. at 715 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)).
27. Id. at 716 (quoting Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
28. The case in Skokie, Illinois involved multiple state and federal court opinions. See, e.g.,
National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676
(7th Cir.), aft'd, 578 F. 2d 1197, cert. denied, Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
29. Certainly my First Amendment professor, the late Gerald Gunther, did not agree with my
concerns about the Skokie case, which was developing at the time I was in his class in 1978.
Although Professor Gunther was an admirer of Justice Powell's balancing approach to First
Amendment issues, Gunther's fears of government regulation of speech themselves stemmed
from his early experiences of living as a Jew in Nazi Germany, and he made it clear in class
that he viewed the attempt to prohibit the march as similar to the suppression of speech in
1930s Germany. See also Gerhard Casper, Tribute to Professor Gerald Gunther: Gerry, 55
STAN. L. REV. 647, 649 (2002) (quoting a speech by Professor Gunther regarding his
opinions about speech and his experience in Nazi Germany). See generally LEE BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986) (protection of speech encourages tolerance of differences necessary in a liberal
democratic society).
30. Hill, 530 U.S. at 715-16.
31. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1992).
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drawn and respectful of the need for robust speech in a democracy." But I am
not neutral about sexual street harassment, either, because of personal experience
with it. I have found it frightening, degrading, and invasive. I have also been
groped and grabbed in public places; two creepy men have felt my elbow in their
stomachs as a result, but mostly I have frozen or fled in fear and dismay. I fail to
see the democratic value of being called insulting names or being hooted at, and
I would argue that absolute First Amendment protection of such speech is as
questionable as it is for racist speech. Of course all the arguments for regulating
these forms of speech as of today have failed to make inroads against First
Amendment protections, but perhaps Dr. Nielsen's book could provide new
ideas for successful approaches to the barriers posed by the First Amendment.
License to Harass begins by suggesting that empirical information might
lead to more informed judicial decisions about protecting offensive racial and
sexual speech under the First Amendment (p. 29). Dr. Nielsen suggests that
because judges lead relatively privileged economic lives and are mostly male and
white, the widespread nature and intense effect of offensive racist and sexist
public speech is invisible to them (pp. 26-38, 172). Dr. Nielsen's data also
confirms that both categories in the study most judges would fall under (white
people and men) underestimated the frequency of offensive racist and sexist
speech (pp. 54-55). Judges would appreciate the widespread nature and harmful
effects of offensive speech if they were more properly informed about its harms,
similar to the acknowledgment of the harm caused by anti-abortion advocates
confronting women at health clinics (harms that were in the news and familiar to
the Justices in Hill). If judges understood the harms, Dr. Nielsen suggests, they
would be more aware of a need to balance First Amendment interests against the
costs to speech, equality, and individual well-being imposed by offensive speech
in public places (pp. 27-28). To illustrate this, Dr. Nielsen compares the relative
judicial tolerance of begging regulations to judicial reluctance to punish or
regulate hate speech, and provides an illuminating comparison (p. 27). Her
argument appears in part to be that, because judges are more likely to have been
targets of panhandlers and beggars, they are more likely to empathize with
people who are targets of begging, and thus more willing to sustain regulations.
34
Her analysis suggests that if the legal establishment realizes there is no
meaningful line to be drawn between different forms of offensive public speech,
perhaps regulation of hate speech would be a serious possibility.
32. For example, Professor Matsuda's careful analysis of factors to consider in regulating
racially offensive speech pays close attention to the important values of the First Amendment
and the need to accommodate them while restricting at least some racist speech, and suggests
a way to avoid undue "suppression of free expression". Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2322-23.
33. Cf. STEPHANIE WLLDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996) (discussing how privileges of race, gender and economic
status render race and gender issues invisible).
34. Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) (suggesting that
engaging judicial empathy can lead to better judicial understanding of harms to people unlike
themselves).
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Dr. Nielsen's use of begging as a category of offensive public speech to
examine in many ways is brilliant, because begging has not historically had
vigorous scholarly defenders or clear First Amendment protection from the
courts. 35 Dr. Nielsen writes that "economic interests" and the privileged status
of commercial and economic activity in the United States explains in part why
the courts are more willing to uphold restrictions on begging (p. 176). Begging
illustrates the selectivity with which "we" and law view the relative values of
speech. Dr. Nielsen argues that many ordinances and laws regulate begging,
which is unmistakably a regulation of speech (pp. 20-23), while attempts to
regulate "hate speech" have been struck down by courts as impermissible
content-based restrictions on speech under the First Amendment (p. 25). Dr.
Nielsen observes that content-based regulations on begging in public places
often pass constitutional scrutiny (pp. 25-27, 176-77). The "perceived social
value of the target of begging" (including privileged white men) influences the
difference in treatment as well (p. 25). According to Dr. Nielsen, "the law
protects people from annoyance and harassment when they are of a certain social
status," and "the law favors the powerful" (pp. 26-27). Dr. Nielsen also notes
people perceive begging as threatening, and creating "an apprehension of
imminent assault,"36 (p. 27) but aside from the occasional aggressive panhandler,
what is threatening about a beggar? Perhaps the homeless and the poor are just
seen as more dangerous and threatening to legal scholars, as a long history of
condemnatory attitudes to the poor transforms them from fully human persons to
"a moral pestilence" 37 who are completely other.38
Certainly there has to be some explanation for the varied treatment
different types of street harassment receives. Whether it is lack of empathy,
social hierarchy, economic interests and pressures, favoring the powerful, or
attitudes toward the speaker's and target's statuses, we must be able to explain
why it can be a crime to "loiter, remain, or wander about for the purpose of
begging," 39 but it cannot be a legal offense, criminal or civil, to loiter with the
purpose of harassing women on the street or to yell racist remarks at people. But
as enlightening as the (lack of) contrast is, it may do little to remove racist and
35. This doesn't mean that there have not been local arguments about the First Amendment and
begging when cities propose bans or regulations on the practice (p. 137). When the city of
Palo Alto considered an ordinance requiring indigent people to keep moving on public streets
and forbid them to sit on benches the city had provided along sidewalks for, well, sitting, in
order to reduce panhandling by the homeless, there were spirited arguments involving First
Amendment and other issues made in papers and to the city council. Freedom of speech
arguments also surfaced when Bay Area cities have sought to ban people from standing on
median strips with signs asking for money on the grounds that the practice impaired traffic.
While the latter seems to be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, homeless
advocates are still quite active in fighting the bans.
36. Quoting Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146, 158 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
37. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (1 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837).
38. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1989) (documenting negative
attitudes to the poor and the "politics of poverty" in U.S. history up to the 1980s).
39. Young, 903 F.2d at 151 (quoting N.Y. Penal Code § 240.35(1)).
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sexist speech from its protected position.
A standard First Amendment argument supporting the regulation of
begging is that it is a content-neutral "time, place, and manner restriction" (p.
25). Beggars impede automobile or foot traffic and thus it is the state's interest
in insuring safe travel that justifies the regulation of begging (p. 162). The
burden of trying to avoid street encounters of other sorts, of changing one's route
to bypass a construction site in order to avoid sexually offensive remarks, for
example, just doesn't "impede" traffic flow in the same manner. It is the
individual's choice to be on the streets at all, or to sneak out the back of a
building to avoid construction workers, or to hitch a ride to school rather than
endure taunts.40 To claim that begging is regulated because it is content-neutral
is to ignore the fact that the law is targeting speech, which Dr. Nielsen makes
clear (p. 25).
Even if courts recognize begging as speech, they can still downgrade its
value to avoid First Amendment problems: Dr. Nielsen observes that in Young v.
New York City Transit Authority,4 1 the court characterized begging as so-called
"low-value" speech, with little social or political import (pp. 21-22). But in my
view, the court's assumption about the worth of the speech breaks down on
further examination. Begging sends a powerful message about the distribution
of wealth in the United States, the conditions of poverty, the lack of government
or social help for the poor, the responsibility for society's least favored members,
the effects of addiction or abuse, and homelessness, including the homelessness
42
of women fleeing abusive partners. Further, "commercial speech" itself now
enjoys considerable First Amendment protection.43 The failure to characterize
begging as politically relevant speech is not so much an analysis of the
communication as it is an attitude towards beggars.
Of course, if negative attitudes toward beggars and panhandlers justifies
regulating their speech, attitudes toward blatant racists should also. And while
courts have refused to engage in heightened scrutiny of treatment of the poor
under the Equal Protection clause,44 racial discrimination receives the highest
40. Bowman, supra note 5 at 539 (discussing how street harassment harms women in urban
environments by restricting their "physical and geographical mobility," diminishing their
feelings of safety, limiting their feelings of safety, hence limiting their everyday choices).
41. Young, 903 F.2d at 146.
42. See KATZ, supra note 38, at 186-94 (discussing homelessness in the U.S.).
43. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (holding that a complete state
ban on alcohol advertisements was not justified and abridged speech in violation of the First
Amendment); Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980) (First
Amendment restrictions suppressing speech must be no more than necessary to serve state
interests); Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976)
(stating that there is "one facet of commercial price and product advertising warrant[ing]
First Amendment protection - its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information
relevant to public and private decision making").
44. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (recognizing
that "wealth discrimination alone [has never] provide[d] an adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (settling on a rational basis test
under the Equal Protection clause to determine the constitutional validity of state AFDC
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level of scrutiny and judicial disapproval. Thus, the combination of ranking
racist speech as "low value" and the recognition of the harmful effects of racism
in our history and culture would seem to merit more regulation of racist hate
speech or racially offensive speech. But the result is exactly the opposite: courts
and many commentators steadfastly assert that the First Amendment protects
racist speech. Regulation of racist public speech that is not an immediate
incitement to violence is impermissible,45 and regulations which specify types of
racist speech, even as examples, are unconstitutional viewpoint or content-based
discrimination.46 Many feminist and critical race theory scholars argue that in
cases of racist speech, freedom of speech ought to be balanced against anti-
subordination and equality concerns. This has failed to find acceptance in the
courts and in much of the legal academy. Indeed, as offensive and harmful to
individuals and race relations as racist speech is, it still falls within the most
protected core of First Amendment political speech.
Sex discrimination also violates the Equal Protection clause,47 and while
the courts have disapproved of various forms of sex discrimination, the use of an
intermediate scrutiny "test" has not recognized many forms of gender-based
discrimination and unequal treatment.4 8 Although bias against females is
considered to be (mostly) wrong in this society, the culture does not uniformly
condemn sexist speech. In fact, sexually suggestive and explicit speech has
staunch defenders. Violent pornography is no exception: the feminist anti-
pornography campaigns of the early and mid 1980's produced deep splits among
feminists49 and strong defense of freedom of speech activists, despite social
science indications that violent pornography, at least, can and does lead to direct
and indirect harm to women.50  Nor is pornography considered "low value"
payments limiting monthly grants regardless of family size).
45. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the leading case stating that before the
state may constitutionally silence the speakers, the speech must advocate "inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such action";
Brandenberg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally. Id. at 445.
46. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (noting that an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" would be needed for exclusion of women from state military college); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that gender based-classifications must withstand
"scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause," and to withstand the challenge, the
classifications "must serve important governmental objectives, and must be substantially
related to those objectives").
48. For an excellent discussion of the contradictions in the sex discrimination jurisprudence of
the courts, see Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281 (1991). See also Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1279 (1987) (discussing the "equal treatment/special treatment" conundrum in sex
equality law that produces unequal results for women).
49. See, e.g., West, supra note 1, at 118-39 (describing the feminist arguments for and against an
anti-pornography campaign); Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987)
(studying debates surrounding adoption of anti-pornography ordinance in Minneapolis).
50. Daniel Linz et al., The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The Gaps Between
"Findings" and Facts, 1887 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 713 (1987) (discussing studies of effects
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speech. According to Judge Easterbrook in American Booksellers v. Hudnut,
51
the fact that pornography sends harmful messages about women and perpetuates
subordination "simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech,"
likening it to protected, political speech and beliefs.5 2
There may be possible approaches to regulation of offensive speech that
would not run afoul of content-based restrictions, as Dr. Nielsen suggests early
in her book:
[I]t is easy to imagine an analysis that parallels the begging cases - a
restriction on speech designed to threaten or terrorize individuals
(content neutral), justified on the state interest in maintaining order, that
prohibits terrorizing speech (on the reasonable person standard). Such a
statute could be considered a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on racist and sexist speech because it leaves open ample
channels of communication such as harassing people in public, crowded
places, during daylight hours, or burning crosses in the same
circumstances. The law proposed here would eliminate the forms of
speech that are, as the respondents indicate.., the most threatening and
frightening, such as when they are spoken to in places with no place to
escape... or when there is no one else around (presumably to come to
the rescue or call authorities if the situation escalates).
(p. 26). The book never discusses this suggestion in any detail, so I am not
sure what Dr. Nielsen had in mind in writing it. The suggestion appears to
advocate a content-neutral, "true threat" approach to offensive speech regulation.
While it is arguably the case that "true threats" may be regulated or punished,
even a threat-based approach encounters difficulties under the First Amendment.
Under present law, a focus on a threat-based analysis for even the most
frightening race-based or sexually suggestive speech would probably encounter
the problem of proving "intent" to threaten. As the multiple opinions in Virginia
v. Black53 suggest, cross burnings cannot be punished unless the state can prove
the actor's intent to intimidate or threaten African Americans (p. 24). 4 Only
Justice Thomas, the sole African American on the Court, had the perception that
burning crosses are per se threatening (p. 172). 55 Presumably, any com-
of viewing different forms of pornography); Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-
Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
Report, 1887 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 681, 686-90 (1987) (discussing testimony of women
who were harmed by pornography).
51. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
52. Id. at 329. Also see, Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 299,
301 (1989), for a good criticism of Judge Easterbrook's opinion noting the failure to
recognize the effects of protecting such speech in the interests of democracy.
53. See 538 U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) (striking down a Virginia statute making cross-burning
prima facie evidence of the intent to intimidate).
54. See id. at 366-67 (discussing different meanings and types of cross burnings; arousal of anger
and hatred was not a good enough reason to ban them all).
55. Id. at 390-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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munication less obvious than burning crosses would make it even harder to
prove the speaker's intent to intimidate another.
56
It is unlikely, given current First Amendment doctrine, and the staunch
defense of hate speech, that public entities will succeed in directly regulating
offensive speech directed at members of groups occupying lower status in race
and gender hierarchies in the United States, at least for some time. The
contradiction between characterizing begging as low value speech and the racist
and sexist speech as protected political speech probably will persist, leaving us
with no apparent means of regulating offensive public speech for the time being.
But there are other reasons to believe legal regulation will not be forthcoming.
B. Additional Barriers to Legal Remedies
Putting aside the First Amendment, in a conservative era it may still be
impossible to muster sufficient support for enacting laws to assist in reducing the
abuse of power and status manifested by street harassment and other offensive
public speech. As reflected by the subjects in the study who were cynical about
regulating street harassment (p. 125), there has been an explosion in literature
claiming that law doesn't change behavior anyway (a resurrection of the old saw,
state ways don't change folk ways). Legal reform efforts of the civil rights era
have been attacked by scholars on the right and the left as having been
counterproductive and harmful. Well-known examples of this literature include
Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change ?, 57 arguing that Brown v. Board of Education58 had little impact on race
discrimination in the South and little influence generally on racial progress, 59 and
Professor Derrick Bell's And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial
Justice, using allegories to demonstrate the failure of law in the struggle to end
56. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). A
majority of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc suggested that the speaker's
actual intent was not the primary inquiry in a "true threats" case. Id. at 1077. Rather, the
majority said the test was whether a reasonable person or reasonable speaker would foresee
that the listener would be intimidated. Id. The record in the case included considerable
evidence of hostility to abortion providers in posters, websites, and so forth, as well as
extensive testimony by the plaintiffs about their fears after one doctor was killed. id. at 1063-
66. It is hard to imagine that such a record could be made in most cases of offensive public
speech.
57. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42-71 (1991).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Professor Michael Klarman has made this argument recently and several scholars engaged
his comments. See David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Book Review: Judicial Power and
Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004)); Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown,
118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)),
(arguing that far from being a failure, Brown was a necessary and moral step in ending
segregation and that the court can make significant, positive difference).
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racism. 60 Another familiar example is the criticism that Roe v. Wade6 1 harmed
the movement to give women access to legal and safe abortions in the United
States, resulting in a backlash which actually empowered anti-choice forces. 62
Furthermore, as Professor Mark Galanter has demonstrated, beginning in the
1970s, conservatives began a successful campaign to undermine the progressive
belief that law could bring about social change across a wide range of issues and
to perpetuate the myth of a "litigation explosion" which harmed Americans.
63
Thus, even if one could persuade legislators (and judges) that real harms are
perpetrated in public spaces every day against women and people of color, and
that street insults constitute threats to the safety and well being of a considerable
portion of our population, the belief that nothing can (or should) be done would
probably prevail, especially since in this "post civil rights" age, the
subordination of people of color or women is no longer seen as much of a social
problem. Those who complain of discrimination are likely to be labeled mere
whiners, trying to gain unfair advantage. Just about any response attempting to
correct their insensitivity or downright insulting remarks is automatically
discounted as "PC" (or enforced "Political Correctness"). The free, everyday
usage of "PC" has reached the point that those hoping to induce consideration
for the feelings of others may feel and be silenced by this "conversation
stopper." 64 The "PC" charge dismisses out of hand all who seek to convey
knowledge about, and sensitivity to discrimination. 65 The likelihood of judicial
empathy for those who must run or walk the gantlet is diminished even further
by the larger society's apathy towards the injustices of racial and gender
discrimination and subordination.
Another development which signifies an unwillingness to change the
existing system has been the enormous backlash that has emerged against
"victims" of even the most severe kind of abuses, not only in right-wing and
60. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(1987). See also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM 47-64 (1992) (postulating a racial preference licensing act given failure of Brown
and civil rights approaches in reducing racial injustice).
61. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
62. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 42-46 (1987)
(Roe interrupted state abortion law liberalization); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992) (Roe "halted a political process[,]...
prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375,
376-382 (1985) (suggesting that Roe stimulated the pro-life movement; the Court went
beyond its purview).
63. Marc Galanter, Essay: The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability,
81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292-93 (2002).
64. I first heard this characterization used by Professor Gerald Torres at the Law & Society
meetings in 1989.
65. Conservatives, however, began using "PC" as a trope to further their own agenda. See E.J.
Dionne, Jr., Race Bait and Switch, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2005, at A23, for a critique of this
strategy discussing recent presidential nominations.
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conservative columns and punditry, 66 but also in so-called "anti-victim
feminism."67 Somehow, pointing to the real, concrete harms rape, abuse, assault,
sexual harassment, and sex discrimination cause and calling for the end of these
harms and for legal sanctions, robs women of their "power" and their "agency,"
as if the actual wrongs done to them have nothing to do with diminishing their
feelings of "power" and "choice." 68 While I don't believe women are incapable
of functioning and acting on their own, I find the anti-victimization arguments
often operate to deny harms to subordinated and abused people. Dr. Nielsen
suggests the kind of "power" and "agency" women employ when harassed on the
street is primarily self-protective (pp. 147-60), what Professor Catharine
MacKinnon has termed a "strategy for sanity,' 69 rather than a means of changing
the power imbalance created by the harasser or even changing the woman's view
of her own feelings of responsibility for the abuse. It is ironic that when
privileged men object to the threat of beggars, no one asserts that they are losing
their agency and power by complaining. 70 Thus, the anti-victimization argument
actually reinforces gender hierarchy by ignoring the harms victims face.
As with objecting to rape, abuse, and discrimination, complaining about
having to endure sexist insults somehow becomes taking on a dreaded "victim
identity." I am not sure what that "identity" is, or why it is so surprising that
victimization can and does affect the human personality. 71 From the anti-victim
identity view, complaining about insulting words directed at one while one is
walking along the street appears to be "over-sensitive," and a whiny attempt at
gaining "victim status." But viewing offensive speech in isolation, away from
66. The one exception, however, is the political appropriation of "crime" victims (usually
homicide victims) in campaigns for "victim's rights" as part of a conservative crime control
agenda. MARCUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIM'S RIGHTS (2002); Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's
Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 581 (1998).
67. Dr. Nielsen mentions this factor in her book, but doesn't criticize or examine the
development of "anti-victim" feminism (p. 117). See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux:
Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995), for a
careful analysis of the issues presented by "anti-victim" feminism and claims of agency. See
also Katha Pollitt, Not Just Bad Sex, in REASONABLE CREATURES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND
FEMINISM, 157, 160-68 (criticizing Katie Roiphe's highly publicized and well-reviewed
book, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (which attacked so-
called "anti-rape" feminists, accusing them of exaggerating rates of rape and portraying
women as "victims") for ignoring facts and realities of rape).
68. Battered women, for example, are at great risk of losing their sense of choice or self efficacy
because of the psychological toll taken by being controlled by another. JUDITH LEWIS
HERMAN, M.D., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 33, 42 (2d ed. 1997); MARY ANN DUTTON,
PH.D., EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN: A MODEL FOR ASSESSMENT
AND INTERVENTION 51-70, 115-28 (1992). It amazes me that people still fail to see that
being denied freedom and living in what amounts to captivity in a totalitarian or authoritarian
regime creates feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. See id. at 74-83.
69. CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 150 (1989).
70. I am indebted to Ann McGinley for this observation.
71. I remain mystified about what it is these critics think is the reward or reason for aspiring to
this identity, rather than having it intrusively foisted upon one against one's will by a
perpetrator.
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the experiences of targets and their knowledge of the dangers and difficulties
presented by their particular status in society, does make it appear that offensive
speech is less of a problem than it actually is. Seen in isolation, a person's
reaction to an offensive remark may seem oversensitive. As Dr. Nielsen
suggests throughout her book, however, such speech does not exist in isolation
from other forms of subordination. For example, women are raised to fear
72
sexual violence, and according to numerous studies, many have already been
victims of rape, sexual abuse, and physical assaults. Dr. Nielsen notes that her
female subjects mentioned actual physical assaults, grabs and groping by
strangers; these quick "copping a feel" maneuvers occur on mass transit, in lines
of people, and on the street (p. 46). Women of color must negotiate a terrain of
threats that include risks of racist and sexist remarks and a history of violence
from white men, as well as risks from men in their own communities. 73 An
outright racist comment directed at a woman, coming from a man, carries with it
a sexual threat as well. And as Dr. Nielsen found, even so-called "polite"
exchanges can lead to men following women and stalking them, adding to the
burdens and fears women already experience in their lives (pp. 45-46). Sexually
suggestive speech is therefore heard in the context of real threats of violence and
intimidation, threats that women know all too well.
The implicit threat in sexually suggestive speech may explain much of the
reason for the "detailed calculus" for going out in public places that many
women described to Dr. Nielsen (pp. 57-65). It also lends itself to thinking of
sexually suggestive speech as a "true threat," at least from the perspective of the
target, although not the courts, at this time. So to assert that women are not
victims, but if they complain, they are assuming a "victim identity," is simply a
means to perpetuate the denial of harm fostered by the continuation of the status
quo. The message is, to be strong and to have agency means to be silent in the
face of abuse. Yet silence enables abuse, leaving existing social subordination
unchallenged.
Offensive race and gender-based speech in public does harm its targets. A
legal solution is beyond the scope of this review, but there are options that
should be considered in thinking about regulation. The subjects of Dr. Nielsen's
study raised very real pragmatic concerns about enforcement of laws prohibiting
offensive public speech. Their views appeared to be influenced by beliefs about
using the criminal law rather than civil law remedies, consistent with many,
although not all, proposals and attempts to regulate hate speech. Practical
considerations do need to be taken into account. Given the hit-and-run nature of
much offensive speech, it may be difficult to comprehend how to prove the
incident even occurred, much less identify and punish the perpetrator. Law
72. Lynne Henderson, Resisting Rape Reform 552-62 (Mar. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law &555 Justice).
73. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) ("[E]xploring
the race and gender dimensions of violence against women of color.").
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enforcement resources are indeed stretched thin in many areas, although such
things as "sweeps" of streets to remove the homeless and/or panhandlers use
considerable law enforcement resources. Because there are other, more violent
crimes that need attention, police, prosecutors, and the public may not have the
time to take speech-based offenses seriously.
74
Some form of civil citation might be imaginable, drawing on the idea of the
business cards a student in one of my classes handed out announcing messages
such as: "You have just insulted a woman. 75  However, fear of violent
encounters might limit alternative mechanisms such as this "citizen complaint,"
served immediately on the offender. Perhaps the end of formal First
Amendment protection might reduce, at least at the margins, the frequency of
offensive remarks based on race and gender. And perhaps a symbolic statement
of disapproval might have some effect. As Dr. Nielsen notes, simply making the
problem visible may lead to some social pressures or actions disapproving of
such speech (p. 177). It is at least worth imagining what law might be able to do,
and it is worth imagining where we can go from Dr. Nielsen's study.
III. CONCLUSION
Currently, the law entitles strangers to whisper, speak, or yell insulting and
offensive words at people in public simply because they are there. The law gives
recipients of these spoken attacks no legal or formal power to remedy the
situation, except perhaps to say something back. The law is not neutral, it is an
enabler of a harmful practice, because the First Amendment protects free speech.
Many individuals might not perceive law as a potential tool for preventing or
correcting the verbal assaults they endure when they enter public spaces. Yet as
Dr. Nielsen's study makes clear, even people in one of the most ostensibly
diverse, "liberal" and tolerant areas of this country must brave a gantlet of verbal
abuse on a daily basis.
Developing our knowledge of the harm produced by such speech cannot
end with this book. As well-done as Dr. Nielsen's study is, it is limited in size
and scope. We need more empirical information, including replication of her
study's design, to build a convincing case for the extent and harmfulness of
offensive public speech. Now that we have this study, and now that Dr.
Nielsen's research does reveal higher frequencies of harassment of women of
color, we need new studies to explore the influence of the intersections of race,
gender, class, and disability on rates and types of street harassment, in order to
know if there are particular harms and occurrences associated with these
statuses. We need to find out more about public views of law regarding legal
74. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HATE
CRIME (2002) (empirical study of law enforcement's interpretation of hate crimes and laws
demonstrating police discretion in identifying and charging hate crime).
75. A student in my Violence Against Women Seminar at U.C. Davis King Hall School of Law
made up some wonderfully designed "cards" which she passed out to the class.
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remedies for offensive speech. We also need to explore ways to delegitimate the
practice of racial and sexual abuse in public places.
Dr. Nielsen's work is an important beginning, and guided by her work, we
can encourage more research and investigation in hopes that something many of
her subjects admitted was a personal and social problem will find a social, and
maybe even a legal, solution. Then, perhaps the public sphere will become less
threatening and a more welcoming place for all persons in our communities.
